JAKARTA – Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country, home to the world’s largest Muslim democracy and at the heart of a key geopolitical region. Yet it continues to carry less weight than it could on the international stage.
While the nation’s founder, Sukarno, helped create the Non-Aligned Movement and dictator Suharto was a key player in the Cold War, the nation at the heart of Southeast Asia has kept a low profile since its democratization in 1998.
“A thousand friends and zero enemies” is the national refrain as political elites focus on the domestic tasks of shaping a post-authoritarian political order and accelerating economic development.
Newly elected President Prabowo Subianto, however, may announce a more active approach to Indonesia’s foreign affairs.
Over the past decade, Indonesian foreign policy has operated relatively automatically. President Joko Widodo, aka Jokowi, had so little taste for foreign policy when he came to power in 2014 that after attending his first ASEAN summit, he told his advisers that he no longer intended to waste his time in that way, and only changed his mind after prodding.
With rare exceptions, such as a wave of presidential diplomacy around the G20 in Bali in 2022, Indonesia’s foreign affairs have been in the hands of Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, a career diplomat who has stuck to Indonesia’s traditional position of non-alignment among major powers while strengthening regional ties.
According to sources familiar with the matter, Prabowo is expected to take a closer look at foreign policy. Unlike Jokowi, Prabowo, 72, has spent much of his life abroad and knows how to do business in English.
After a decades-long run for president, some say he wants to leave a lasting legacy, an instinct that often drives leaders to look to success abroad. His age and fragile health are sure to add to that sense of urgency.
What will this mean for the region and the rest of the world? Prabowo, currently the defense minister and a former special forces general, is known for his commitment to Indonesian sovereignty, his irascible temper and his penchant for off-the-cuff comments.
At the same time, some experts believe that he is primarily a pragmatist. Geopolitical realities and a talented bureaucracy in the Foreign Ministry will likely prevent him from straying too far from the usual policy of cautious non-alignment and good relations with all, to which Prabowo has already rhetorically committed, while making fiery digressions on the need for greater national power.
Some cite former President Abdurrahman Wahid, aka Gus Dur, whose often unconventional foreign policy instincts were contained and limited by cautious career diplomats.
On the central geopolitical issue of growing tensions between the United States and China, Indonesia, like most ASEAN powers, has little interest in being drawn into conflict.
China is Indonesia’s second largest source of investment and plays an important role in key infrastructure projects and the strategic nickel industry. Despite tensions over the nine-dash line that straddles some of Indonesia’s territorial waters, there are strong incentives to keep bilateral relations at a balanced level.
The US’s economic engagement, by contrast, is widely seen as disappointing, but the US is still seen as a security partner, arms supplier and important counterweight to China. This is particularly important for Prabowo, who has long expressed his belief in the importance of military power and is seeking foreign partners to fuel an ambitious military modernization program.
So far, China has arguably played a more adept role in courting Prabowo. This was seen in the highly unusual move of inviting Prabowo on an official visit to Beijing before his formal inauguration as president.
The United States, for its part, reportedly left Prabowo feeling offended. While ambassadors rushed to congratulate Prabowo on his election victory on February 14, the Americans waited until his victory was officially ratified more than a month later.
Complications surrounding Prabowo’s ability to enter the United States while he was defense secretary, even after a visa ban related to accusations of human rights abuses dating back to the 1990s, were also said to have stung the former soldier.
There is no sign, however, that these resentments will greatly affect Prabowo’s foreign policy. Whatever his personal feelings during his tenure as defense minister, Prabowo has steadily improved Indonesia’s security ties with the United States, including by stepping up joint military exercises.
Indeed, Prabowo’s security concerns are expected to prompt him to distance himself more from China than Jokowi, who has visited the country eight times in his 10-year presidency.
In particular, Prabowo is expected to take a tougher line on Chinese intrusions into Indonesian territorial waters, though few imagine him going as far as the Philippines, which radically changed its tone and actions toward China under the US-aligned regime of Ferdinand Marcos Jr.
Indonesian foreign policy stalwarts appear to welcome the move as a necessary adjustment to Jokowi’s perceived passivity on the issue.
Prabowo’s apparent desire to play a more active role on the international stage could lead him to make Indonesia’s voice heard on current crises. In 2023, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, a defense conference in Singapore, he shocked many, including the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, by using his speech to propose a peace plan for Ukraine.
Returning to the conference this year, he reiterated his peace proposal while proposing Indonesia’s participation in a hypothetical UN peacekeeping force for a post-conflict Gaza Strip – although this time the foreign ministry appears to have been informed in advance.
Burma, where the junta installed by the coup appears increasingly precarious on the battlefield, could also attract its attention as the risk of regional repercussions increases.
It is not yet clear what he might accomplish in these foreign policy areas, as the conflicts are intractable and Indonesia has no known leverage to influence developments in Gaza or Ukraine.
Myanmar, which is still technically part of ASEAN, could offer Indonesia an opportunity to play a mediating role between the rebels and the military regime. Indonesia successfully played such a role by helping mediate peace in Cambodia in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Any effective intervention in Myanmar or elsewhere would require close coordination with its foreign minister and the diplomatic bureaucracy. It is crucial that Prabowo replace Retno as the country’s top diplomat.
Since the Reform era, the minister has typically been a technocrat who has risen through the ranks of the bureaucracy and whose personality fits the president. However, some are already speculating that Prabowo could tap a career politician or other ally.
Roesan Roeslani, a businessman and former ambassador to the United States who played a key role in Prabowo’s presidential campaign; Fadli Zon, a member of Prabowo’s Gerindra party; Dino Pati Djalal, a former deputy foreign minister and key foreign policy adviser under President Susilo Bambang Yudhyono; and Meutya Hafid, a member of the Golkar party and chairman of the parliamentary foreign policy committee, have all been suggested as possibilities.
While all of these choices would be unconventional, most would probably be useful, although one might question their mastery of bureaucracy.
The only exception is Fadli Zon, a militant politician known for his ties to Islamist groups, his praise for Russian President Vladimir Putin and his blatant prejudice against ethnic Chinese Indonesians, whose appointment to the post would alarm everyone at home and abroad.
Prabowo’s final choice, technocrat or otherwise, will perhaps be the best indication of the priorities of a man who, despite being a veteran of Indonesian politics, policymaking and military affairs, retains an unpredictable streak and a penchant for surprises.
Joseph Rachman is a freelance journalist based in Jakarta covering Indonesian and ASEAN news. Follow him on X at @rachman_joseph
