US President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the presidential race is just the latest development in a string of very interesting news stories over the past two weeks from the US, an election I once called a boring one, but now I’ve completely lost interest in.
But with just 100 days left until the election and US domestic politics becoming increasingly heated, similar twists and turns should not be expected in the foreign policy sphere.
America’s approach to the world has entered a set-it-and-forget-it phase. Despite a new face soon to be named as the top Democratic candidate, US foreign policy is likely to get boring. Here’s why.
It’s the economy, idiot.
The US presidential campaign has focused on issues at home, the issues most relevant to the average voter’s daily life. Foreign policy is not one of them. With 80 percent of US voters feeling that their country is “out of control” just last week, even the most compelling international initiatives are unlikely to be enough to spur voters to turn out to the polls in November’s election.
Voters are driven by issues such as the cost of living, affordable health care, education, access to social services, and a sense of security. In a troubled world, there may be temptation for the new Democratic candidate to try to influence U.S. foreign policy, but the focus for the rest of the year will be on the economy.
Foreign policy is often accused of being the lofty domain of naive Washington elites, or so-called “blobs.”
In this year’s election, the economy has stubbornly topped the list of Americans’ biggest concerns: Despite encouraging economic indicators such as better-than-expected growth, a strong labor market, and declining inflation, less than a quarter of Americans (23%) say the economy is doing well.
In fact, 36% cite the economy as the most important issue facing the United States right now, and an additional 22% cite immigration. Only about 8% say the same about foreign policy issues.
Emergeing as the People’s President
Promises to lower the cost of living or reduce crime rates not only create attractive policies, but also make a candidate more relatable.
Foreign policy is often accused of being the lofty domain of naive Washington elites, or “blobs,” like 2016 presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, whose aloof image was cemented by her perceived indifference to issues at home, like Rust Belt coal jobs.
That’s one reason Biden speaks so often about his working-class upbringing, the importance of unions and worker-centered trade policy, and being a single father. It resonates with people: In 2020, Biden gained support among suburban voters (+9%) and white non-college-educated voters (+5%) over Clinton’s 2016 efforts.
When a majority of Americans (55%) want the U.S. to pay less attention to the problems of other countries and focus more on domestic issues, campaigning on a calculated foreign policy platform doesn’t do much for a candidate who wants to represent the average American.
Continuing Biden’s foreign policy
Capitalizing on these isolationist tendencies, Republican candidate Trump Vance has presented a hard-line isolationist foreign policy in which the United States would withdraw from foreign wars, particularly the one in Ukraine, cut foreign aid, ensure national security through domestic strength, and take a zero-sum approach to international trade (e.g., 100% tariffs on Chinese-made cars).
This has some support among voters: A third of Americans (31%) and a majority of Republicans say the U.S. is giving too much aid to Ukraine. Another third and a majority of Republicans believe the U.S. has not benefited from its membership in NATO.
Finding a foreign policy strategy that will appeal to the American public is a tricky calculation: You can’t appear publicly “woke” or “outlandish.”
But Trump’s surprising comment that Russia could “do whatever it wanted” if NATO allies didn’t pay their defense needs was a sharp shift in isolationism that did little to boost security sentiment. This is a far cry from the significant majority of Americans (43%) who still want the U.S. to be more actively involved in international affairs, and from the majority of Trump’s supporters, who are even more opposed to reducing the U.S. military presence in allied countries than Biden is.
Finding a foreign policy strategy that appeals to the American people is a difficult calculus: it must not appear publicly “woke” or “outlandish,” balance external responsibilities with domestic priorities, and maintain just enough U.S. involvement in international affairs to ensure the nation’s security and interests without overinvolving.
This description fits with the tenets of the Biden administration’s “foreign policy for the middle class” strategy, which has seen the US build domestic manufacturing and defense capabilities while respecting alliance networks and international institutions. Thus, the new and unknown face of the Democratic Party will almost certainly look a lot like Biden.
The world awaits clues as to the direction that the Democratic nominee will take U.S. foreign policy, whoever that may be. Speculation has already begun about Kamala Harris’ possible approach. It’s tempting to scrutinize the campaign to see what will happen once the new president is inaugurated in January. But these messages aren’t aimed at us pundits abroad; they’re aimed at American voters who want to know more than whether their presidential candidate bemoans the price of a loaf of bread as much as they do, or whether there’s a plan for a hypothetical security crisis in the Taiwan Strait.
