Sam Roggeveen argues: translator Australia is exploring a defense and military agreement with Indonesia to prevent China from dominating the Southeast Asian maritime world. Some have debated why such an agreement is unlikely, but one factor that has not been fully explored is Indonesia’s continued commitment to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the concept of “ASEAN centrality.”
Australia and Indonesia certainly share significant strategic challenges posed by Beijing’s growing influence and assertive foreign policy. Australia, for example, only recently stabilized its relations with Beijing after a broad, three-year economic pressure campaign. Indonesia, on the other hand, is embroiled in a dispute with China over the resource-rich Natuna Sea and is taking advantage of Beijing’s disruptive influence over ASEAN, Southeast Asia’s central multilateral organization.
Other ASEAN member states have military alliances: the Philippines and Thailand, for example, are allied with the United States, and the Philippines also has a growing military partnership with Japan.
Yet Australia has historically been of low strategic importance to Indonesia, and as geopolitical competition intensifies between the United States and China, Indonesia has prioritized Japan and the European Union over Australia as partners to hedge against growing uncertainty.
Allying with Australia to counter China would not only undermine efforts to maintain ASEAN’s relevance but also demonstrate Indonesia’s lack of trust in ASEAN-led institutions.
This raises the question of whether such a military alliance would be feasible and desirable from Indonesia’s perspective.
Indonesia’s view of the Indo-Pacific is very different from Australia’s. While Australia has pledged allegiance to its ally in Washington, Indonesia refuses to side with any great power. This non-aligned stance was formulated soon after independence and continues to influence Indonesia’s foreign policy. It is why, for example, Indonesia did not take part in the joint statement issued at last month’s Ukraine peace summit because Russia was not included in the negotiations.
A military pact with Australia, even if limited, would go against this fundamental principle of non-alignment. Importantly, Indonesia, like Australia, does not see China as a threat. Indonesia benefits greatly from good relations with China and the United States. These two powers are also Indonesia’s largest trading partners and are key to its goal of becoming a high-income country by 2045.
For the Indonesian government, the destabilizing effects of great power competition are the biggest threat to the region. Thus, while Indonesia is concerned about China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia, this does not translate into support for an expanded military presence by the United States and its allies. Instead, Indonesia promotes an inclusive regional order based on cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution. This is primarily done through ASEAN, which became the center of a network of multilateral institutions in Asia after the end of the Cold War, such as the East Asia Summit, and continues to play a central role in facilitating Indonesia’s engagement with regional powers.
However, Indonesia’s insistence on its centrality to ASEAN is another obstacle to the Australia-Indonesia military pact. As the US-China competition intensifies, ASEAN is paralyzed by differences in its member states’ geopolitical alignments and a slow decision-making process. New security arrangements such as the Quad and AUKUS make ASEAN-led multilateral mechanisms increasingly irrelevant.
Indonesia has traditionally been a leading voice in ASEAN and has invested a lot of diplomatic capital in maintaining ASEAN’s unity and importance in the Indo-Pacific. For example, Indonesia has advocated for guidelines to accelerate negotiations on a code of conduct in the South China Sea, ASEAN’s main platform for managing conflicts. Previously, Jakarta has tried to use its leadership role in ASEAN to promote and operationalize the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, a vision document that reaffirms ASEAN’s centrality and reemphasizes the importance of dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution in the region. Allying with Australia to counter China would not only undermine these efforts to maintain ASEAN’s importance, but also signal that Indonesia has no confidence in ASEAN-led institutions.
This commitment to ASEAN means a defense agreement will not be easy. Yet the case for a closer defense relationship is strong. Australia and Indonesia not only share an interest in safe and peaceful maritime zones for national security; free access to sea lanes of communication is also directly linked to the prosperity of both countries. More than 20 percent of global trade passes through the disputed South China Sea alone annually. Australia should therefore pursue alternative strategies to strengthen its security partnership with Indonesia.
Cooperation on common security challenges, including terrorism, climate change and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, has built institutional trust and close relationships between our two militaries and law enforcement agencies. Australia is a valued partner to Indonesia, supporting capacity building, education and joint training. Our continued focus and support on Indonesia’s specific defence needs allows Canberra to enhance mutual trust and confidence.
President-elect Prabowo Subianto is likely to welcome and support these efforts. As defense minister from 2019 to 2024, he continued to modernize the military and expand defense cooperation with Western countries. In 2022, for example, Australia will join the U.S.-Indonesia Garuda Shield exercise for the first time. Earlier this year, Prabowo and Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles also announced plans to conclude the “most significant” bilateral defense agreement to date.
Indonesia’s non-aligned stance and commitment to ASEAN centrality make a military agreement unlikely in the near future, but there remains a strong possibility that the two countries will cooperate based on common strategic objectives.
